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作者：Martínez, R; Massó, J; Neme, A; Oviedo, J
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Some properties of the set of many-re-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be single in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching...
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作者：Ebert, U; Moyes, P
作者单位：Carl von Ossietzky Universitat Oldenburg; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Bordeaux; Universite de Bordeaux
摘要：The paper examines the redistributive impact of income taxation for heterogeneous populations. An equivalent income function is introduced in order to adjust the incomes of different types of households and the redistributive performance of the tax system is evaluated by comparing the Lorenz curves of the distributions of before and after tax equivalent incomes. Inequality reduction after tax imposes mild consistency conditions which are met by most current tax systems. If the inequality reduc...
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作者：Balder, EJ
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：In recent years attempts were made to extend the equilibrium existence results of Gale and Mas-Colell (1975. J.Math. Econ. 2, 9-15) and Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975, J. Math. Econ. 2, 345-348) to continuum economies. Here it is shown that the usual conditions used for these attempts force the preferred to correspondence to be empty-valued almost everywhere on the nonatomic part of the measure space of agents. Several published continuum extensions of the existence results of Shafer and Sonncn...
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作者：Austen-Smith, D; Banks, JS
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We augment the standard Crawford-Sobel (1982. Econometrica 50, 1431-1451) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap tall signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Coleman, WJ
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper verifies the uniqueness of an equilibrium for a class of stochastic infinite-horizon economies with capital that are subject to distortionary taxes or externalities. The proof develops the property of concavity Tor a nonlinear monotone operator whose fixed points correspond to equilibria. As the underlying monotone operator has been useful for establishing the existence of an equilibrium. and for computing an equilibrium, this approach also brings under one roof the study of existen...
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作者：Lockwood, B
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but where there are positive production externalities between agents: the output of any agent depends positively on the effort expended by other agents. It is shown that the optimal contract for the principal exhibits two-way distortion: the effort of any agent is oversupplied (relative to the first-best) when his marginal cost of effort is low, and undersupplied taken his marginal cost of effort is high....
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作者：Aliprantis, CD; Tourky, R; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Melbourne; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：The modern convex-analytic rendition of the classical welfare theorems characterizes optimal allocations in terms of supporting properties of preferences by nonzero prices. While supporting convex sets in economies with finite dimensional commodity spaces is usually a straightforward application of the separation theorem, it is not that automatic in economies with infinite dimensional commodity spaces. In the last 30 years several characterizations of the supporting properties of convex sets b...
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作者：Sarin, R
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study a model in which a decision maker has limited memory. For a large class of decision rules that may be used to select among strategies the decision maker converges to play the maxmin strategy. The result arises not because of any inherent caution on the part of the decision maker, but because the decision maker's memory eventually contains only bad payoffs From the strategies no longer considered the best. Hence, a new rationale is provided for maxmin behavior. Classification Numbers C...
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作者：Chang, R; Velasco, A
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; New York University; Universidad de Chile; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study financial fragility, exchange rate crises, and monetary policy in a model of an open economy with Diamond-Dybvig banks. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks on the currency become possible. We compare currency boards, fixed rates, and flexible rates, with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot...
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作者：Blume, A; Gneezy, U
作者单位：University of Iowa; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Classification Numbers: C72, C92. 2000 Academic Press.
