Cheap talk and burned money
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Austen-Smith, D; Banks, JS
署名单位：
Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2591
发表日期：
2000
页码：
1-16
关键词：
摘要：
We augment the standard Crawford-Sobel (1982. Econometrica 50, 1431-1451) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap tall signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
来源URL：