An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blume, A; Gneezy, U
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2573
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 161-172
• 关键词: coordination; learning; language; common knowledge

摘要

This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Classification Numbers: C72, C92. 2000 Academic Press.