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作者：Pattanaik, PK; Xu, YS
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper examines how freedom of choice as reflected in an agent's opportunity sets can be measured in economic environments where opportunity sets are non empty and compact subsets of the non-negative orthant of the n-dimensional real space. Several plausible axioms are proposed for this purpose. It is then shown that, under different sets of axioms, one can represent the ranking of compact opportunity sets by different types of real-valued functions with intuitively plausible properties. J...
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作者：Loewenstein, M; Willard, GA
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study rational equilibrium asset-pricing bubbles in an economic environment in which agents are allowed to trade continuously, including as special cases some models From financial economics. For positive net supply assets, we present new necessary and sufficient conditions For the absence of bubbles in complete and incomplete markets equilibria with several types of borrowing constraints. For zero net supply assets. including financial derivatives with finite maturities, we show that bubbl...
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作者：Diermeier, D; Merlo, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena: (1) minority and surplus governments; (2) cabinet reshuffles; (3) cabinet terminations due to replacement of early elections; (4) the relative instability of minority governments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72 . H19. C73. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Epstein, LG
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Working in a complete-markets setting, a property of asset demands is identified that thai is inconsistent with the investor's preference being based on probabilities. In this way, a market counterpart of the Ellsberg Paradox is provided. Journal Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D00. D80. D81. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Discounting the utilities of future people or giving smaller weights to groups other than one's own is often criticized on the grounds that the resulting objective function differs from the ethically appropriate one. This paper investigates the consequences of changes in the discount rate and weights when they are moved toward the warranted ones. Using the utilitarian value function, it is shown that, except in restrictive special casts, those moves do not necessarily lead to social improvemen...
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作者：Arya, A; Glover, J; Rajan, U
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies implementation in a principal agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. We also construct simple implementing mechanisms that rely on the single crossing property and on assump...
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作者：Ellison, G; Fudenberg, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：We examine the local stability of mixed equilibria in a smoothed fictitious play model. Our model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as other models in 2 x 2 games. We focus on 3 x 3 games. Contrary to some previous suggestions, learning can sometimes provide a justification for complicated mixed equilibria. Whether an equilibrium is stable often depends on the distribution of payoff perturbations. The totally mixed equilibria of zero sum games are generically stable, and the t...
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作者：Hervés-Beloso, C; Moreno-Garcia, E; Nunez-Sanz, C; Pascoa, MR
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We consider a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities and show that, for any positive epsilon, the core of the economy coincides with the set of allocations which are not blocked by any coalition with measure less than epsilon. Actually, our main result is an extension of Grodal's (1972, Econometrica 40, 581-583) result and, therefore, Schmeidler's (1972. Econometrica 40, 579-580) result to economics whose commodity space is l(infinity), for myopic preferences. Journal of Economic L...
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作者：Blume, A
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper explores how efficiency promotes the use of structure in language. It starts from the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means ibr saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. It is reasonable to expect that in a rich and changing environment, language will be incomplete. This encourages reliance on structure. It is shown how creative language use emerges from common knowledge structures, even if those structures are consistent w...
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作者：Dixit, A; Londregan, J
作者单位：Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：If political power and motives to invest in government bonds are positively correlated across voting groups, then a self-selection equilibrium can arise where the government's promise to repay its debt is credible. We illustrate this using a formal model where the alternative use of wealth is to acquire human capital. Classification Numbers: D72, E60, H63. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
