Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chang, R; Velasco, A
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; New York University; Universidad de Chile; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2621
发表日期：
2000
页码：
1-34
关键词：
摘要：
We study financial fragility, exchange rate crises, and monetary policy in a model of an open economy with Diamond-Dybvig banks. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks on the currency become possible. We compare currency boards, fixed rates, and flexible rates, with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot implement a social optimum; in addition, it allows bank runs to occur. A fixed exchange rate sq stem may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board. A flexible rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs, provided that the exchange rate and credit policies of the central bank are appropriately designed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F3, E5, G2. (C) 2000 Academic Press.