Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Martínez, R; Massó, J; Neme, A; Oviedo, J
署名单位：
Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
发表日期：
2000
页码：
91-105
关键词：
摘要：
Some properties of the set of many-re-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be single in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: J41. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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