Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ben-Porath, E
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00011-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 45-71
• 关键词: communication; Bayesian games; Sequential equilibrium

摘要

The paper studies Bayesian games which are extended by adding pre-play communication. Let Gamma be a Bayesian game with full support and with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q, that is rational (i.e., involves probabilities that are rational numbers) can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of Gamma, provided that the following condition is satisfied: There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s in Gamma such that for each type t(i) of each player i the expected payoff of t(i) in q is larger than the expected payoff of t(i) in s. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.