Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benchekroun, H
• 署名单位: McGill University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00090-5
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 214-239
• 关键词: unilateral restriction; Dynamic game; duopoly

摘要

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a doupoly. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction. Surprisingly, such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long-run asset's stock. We also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset's stock and the long-run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction. Moreover, a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.