Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ennis, HM; Keister, T
• 署名单位: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00014-0
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 220-245
• 关键词: banking panics; Deposit contracts; Capital formation; endogenous growth; Sunspot equilibrium; equilibrium selection

摘要

We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output. In addition, the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks, and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. These facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods. A bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots, and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules. In the first, a run occurs with a fixed, exogenous probability, while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks' portfolio choices. We show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank, the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.