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作者：Predtetchinski, A; Herings, PJJ
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：it is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the pi-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the core. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights...
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作者：Eraslan, H; McLennan, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton-DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candid...
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作者：Caballero, RJ; Krishnamurthy, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Emerging economies are often exposed to sudden shortages of international financial resources. Yet domestic agents do not seem to take preventive measures against these sudden stops. We highlight the central role played by the limited development of ex ante (insurance) and ex post (spot) domestic financial markets in generating this collective undervaluation of international resources. We study several policies to counteract the external underinsurance. We do this by solving for the optimal me...
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作者：Caillaud, B; Mezzetti, C
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending-price auctions. The seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction. Despite the lack of commitment by the seller, we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties. Strategic non-disclosure of information takes the form of non-participation in the early auction by low-valuation bidders, while high-valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations. Some bu...
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作者：Kehoe, PJ; Perri, F
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private a...
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作者：Décamps, JP; Mariotti, T
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a duopoly model of investment, in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information, and possibly the experience of his rival. Investment costs are private information, and the background signal takes the form of a Poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low. The resulting attrition game has a unique, symmetric equilibrium, which depends on initial public beliefs. We determine the impact of chan...
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作者：Echenique, F; Edlin, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria-equilibria that are not in pure strategies-are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Piccione, M; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a model in which being more powerful does not necessarily imply being wealthier. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
