Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caillaud, B; Mezzetti, C
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 78-95
• 关键词: repeated auctions; ratchet effect; PARTICIPATION; reserve price

摘要

We study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending-price auctions. The seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction. Despite the lack of commitment by the seller, we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties. Strategic non-disclosure of information takes the form of non-participation in the early auction by low-valuation bidders, while high-valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations. Some buyers who would profitably buy at the reserve price refrain from participating in order to decrease the second-auction reserve price. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.