Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eraslan, H; McLennan, A
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 29-54
• 关键词: Voting; candidate stability; candidate withdrawal; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; arrow's theorern; political economy

摘要

Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton-DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.