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作者：Haimanko, O; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Southern Methodist University
摘要：In this paper we examine a group formation problem, where heterogeneous individuals partitioned themselves into communities, each choosing its own public project from the given space of feasible projects. The model is that of horizontal product differentiation where individuals display distinct preferences over the policy space. We consider the notion of efficient configuration that minimizes the total project-related costs and aggregate personalized costs of all individuals, and sustainable c...
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作者：Ghosal, S; Morelli, M
作者单位：University of Warwick; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient real location of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a non-cooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade allocations, consistent with Edgeworth's idea of recontracting. We show (a) there are Pareto optimal allocations, including competitive equilibrium allocations, that can be approximated arbitrarily closely when trade is myopic, i.e., when agents play a static Nash equilibrium a...
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作者：Neeman, Z
作者单位：Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information and are sufficiently risk neutral, it is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents. We show that these full-rent-extraction results hinge on the implicit assumption that the agents' beliefs uniquely determine their preferences. We present an example of the voluntary provision of a public good in which this assumption is relaxed, and consequently, eve...
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作者：Milchtaich, I
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Congestion externalities may result in nonoptimal equilibria. For these to occur, it suffices that facilities differ in their fixed utilities or costs. As this paper shows, the only case in which equilibria are always socially optimal, regardless of the fixed components, in that in which the costs increase logarithmically with the size of the set of users. Therefore, achieving a socially optimal choice of facilities generally requires some form of external intervention or cooperation. For hete...
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作者：Sertel, M; Yildiz, M
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Turk Standardlari Enstitusu (TSE); Turkish Academy of Sciences
摘要：Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individually rational sub-allocation the complementary coalition picks, when we paste all the agents back together at their new endowments and apply the allocation rule to this collage economy, each member o...
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作者：Chakraborty, S
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：Endogenous mortality is introduced in a two-period overlapping generations model: probability of surviving from the first period to the next depends upon health capital that is augmented through public investment. High mortality societies do not grow fast since shorter lifespans discourage savings; development traps are possible. Productivity differences across nations result in persistent differences in capital-output ratios and relatively larger gaps in income and mortality. High mortality a...
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作者：Krebs, T
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper analyzes one-good exchange economies with two infinitely lived agents and incomplete markets, It is shown that there are no recursive (Markov) equilibria for which borrowing (debt) constraints never bind if the state space of exogenous and endogenous variables is a compact subset of R-n. Moreover, for large enough (but finite) borrowing limits, no recursive equilibrium with compact state space exists. These non-existence results hold for any economy satisfying the following standard...
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作者：Burnside, C; Eichenbaum, M; Rebelo, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Northwestern University
摘要：We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks' foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to f...
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作者：Christiano, LJ; Gust, C; Roldos, J
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; International Monetary Fund
摘要：What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modelled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the ...
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作者：Inderst, R
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions. While principals (e.g., firms) have all contractual power, their market power is constrained as agents (e.g., workers) can choose to wait and search for better offers. We find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents' utilities. With type-independent costs of search and waiting, equilibrium contracts are always first-best. If agents are impatient and discount future payoffs, how...
