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作者：Chari, VV; Kehoe, PJ
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Financial crises are widely argued to be due to herd behavior. Yet recently developed models of herd behavior have been subjected to two critiques which seem to make them inapplicable to financial crises. Herds disappear from these models if two of their unappealing assumptions are modified: if their zero-one investment decisions are made continuous and if their investors are allowed to trade assets with market-determined prices. However, both critiques are overturned-herds reappear in these m...
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作者：Goldstein, I; Pauzner, A
作者单位：Duke University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We look at two countries that have independent fundamentals, but share the same group of investors. Each country might face a self-fulfilling crisis: Agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will. A crisis in one country reduces agents' wealth. This makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country, increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments. Consequently, the probability of a crisis there incre...
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作者：Pitchford, R; Snyder, CA
作者单位：George Washington University; Australian National University
摘要：We consider a setting in which the buyer's ability to hold up a seller's investment is so severe that there is no investment in equilibrium of the static game typically analyzed. We show that there exists an equilibrium of a related dynamic game generating positive investment. The seller makes a sequence of gradually smaller investments, each repaid by the buyer under the threat of losing further seller investment. As modeled frictions converge to zero, the equilibrium outcome converges to the...
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作者：Bull, J; Watson, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We explore the notion of verifiability by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in contractual relationships with complete information. We characterize implementability in terms of the existence and form of hard evidence. We provide results on maximal and minimal evidence production that are, respectively, necessary and sufficient for implementation. We briefly discuss the relevance of our results to actual legal institutions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Blume, A; Heidhues, P
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Moro, A; Norman, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interact-on between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate dis...
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作者：Anderson, ET; Kumar, N; Rajiv, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; National University of Singapore
摘要：In this note, we prove that the equilibrium proposed by Padilla [2, Theorem 1] is not an equilibrium for c
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作者：Kunimoto, T; Serrano, R
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods). (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Chakraborty, A; Yilmaz, B
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number ...
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作者：Skrzypacz, A; Hopenhayn, H
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to the availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg et al. (Econometrica 62 (1994) 997-1039) shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if players are patient and communicate before auctions. We ask how t...
