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作者：Manduchi, A
作者单位：Jonkoping University
摘要：A model of advertising and price distributions is investigated whereby each seller can contact different buyers, whose preferences are identical, with different probabilities. The model features a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the ratio of the buyers contacted by one seller-differing across market segments-and by the other sellers. In general, the sellers practice price discrimination across segments. More asymmetric equilibria correspond to higher volumes of transactions and higher ...
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作者：Ben-Shoham, A; Serrano, R; Volij, O
作者单位：Iowa State University; Brown University; Harvard University
摘要：Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models, traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models differ in the probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set of stochastically stable allocations contains the set of efficient allocations. When more serious m...
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作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider one-to-one matching problems when preferences are weak orders and search for (Maskin-)mono tonic and implementable solutions. We show that for any coalition structure F, the strong F-core is monotonic if and only if it is the individually rational solution. We introduce a solution, which we call the union strong F-core, and show that this solution is the minimal way to expand the strong F-core recovering monotonicity. We also show that the union strong F-core is implementable. (C) ...
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作者：Caballero, RJ; Krishnamurthy, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Emerging economies are often exposed to sudden shortages of international financial resources. Yet domestic agents do not seem to take preventive measures against these sudden stops. We highlight the central role played by the limited development of ex ante (insurance) and ex post (spot) domestic financial markets in generating this collective undervaluation of international resources. We study several policies to counteract the external underinsurance. We do this by solving for the optimal me...
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作者：Caillaud, B; Mezzetti, C
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending-price auctions. The seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction. Despite the lack of commitment by the seller, we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties. Strategic non-disclosure of information takes the form of non-participation in the early auction by low-valuation bidders, while high-valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations. Some bu...
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作者：Ishiguro, S
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：In a principal-multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through side-transfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a discriminatory policy in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend oil their identities even if they are identical with respect to ...
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作者：Kehoe, PJ; Perri, F
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private a...
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作者：Décamps, JP; Mariotti, T
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a duopoly model of investment, in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information, and possibly the experience of his rival. Investment costs are private information, and the background signal takes the form of a Poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low. The resulting attrition game has a unique, symmetric equilibrium, which depends on initial public beliefs. We determine the impact of chan...
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作者：Echenique, F; Edlin, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria-equilibria that are not in pure strategies-are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Piccione, M; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a model in which being more powerful does not necessarily imply being wealthier. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
