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作者：Corominas-Bosch, M
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network. Players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer. Our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium. This paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of th...
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作者：Larson, N
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：I study how having a choice about who to play affects the conventions that arise in a population playing a 2 x 2 common interest game. Match choice allows agents playing fragile but efficient strategies to isolate themselves, raising their returns but making it harder for outsiders to duplicate their success. When agents are myopic, the second effect dominates: long run play can shift toward either the risk-dominant equilibrium (with common interests in matching) or toward the inefficient equi...
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作者：Calvó-Armengol, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Many workers bear about or obtain their jobs through friends and relatives. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we relate both individual and aggregate labor market outcomes to the network structure of personal contacts. Second, we study strategic network formation. To this purpose, we develop a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to form contacts with other agents, and the process by which information about jobs is obtained and transmitted. We show that equilibrium...
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作者：Levin, D; Ozdenoren, E
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders ill the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller pr...
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作者：Sorger, G
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We study properties of stationary Markov-perfect equilibria in a general model of intertemporal choice under quasi-geometric discounting. The dynamics generated by stationary Markov-perfect equilibria can be very complicated, even if the model satisfies strict convexity and smoothness properties and the decision maker is arbitrarily patient. If there exist multiple stationary Markov-perfect equilibria, then it is in general possible to construct infinitely many non-degenerate stationary sunspo...
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作者：Haeringer, G
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not e...
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作者：Gajdos, T; Maurin, E
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：In this paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social welfare functions for uncertain incomes. Our most general result is that a small number of reasonable assumptions regarding welfare orderings under uncertainty rule out pure ex ante as well as pure ex post evaluations. Any social welfare function that satisfies these axioms should lie strictly between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of income distributions. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the weighted av...
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作者：Hong, H; Shum, M
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Princeton University
摘要：We study the rates at which transaction prices aggregate information in common value auctions under the different information structures in Wilson (Rev. Econ. Stud. 44 (1977) 511) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (Econometrica 65 (1997) 1247). We consider uniform-price auctions in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned to it bidders, where both n and k are allowed to diverge to infinity, and k/n converges to a number in [0, 1). The Wilson assumptions lead to information aggregati...
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作者：Challe, E
摘要：This paper uses a stylised asset-pricing model to show that sunspots may cause asset returns to be predictable, a widely documented feature of many speculative markets. This result parallels and extends previous works showing that sunspots render asset prices excessively volatile. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ghirardato, P; Maccheroni, F; Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker (DM)'s response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a general decision model. We introduce a relation derived from the DM's preferences, called unambiguous preference, and show that it can be represented by a set of probabilities. We provide such set with a simple differential characterization, and argue that it is a behavioral representation of the ambiguity that the DM may perceive. Given such revealed a...
