Collusion and discrimination in organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ishiguro, S
• 署名单位: University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 357-369
• 关键词: Collusion; DISCRIMINATION; moral hazard; multi-agent; relative performance evaluation

摘要

In a principal-multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through side-transfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a discriminatory policy in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend oil their identities even if they are identical with respect to productive abilities. Such discriminatory wage schemes explain the organizational strategy of divide and conquer as an optimal response to collusion. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.