Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, L
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00107-8
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 358-369
• 关键词: Implementation; MONOTONICITY; strong core

摘要

We consider one-to-one matching problems when preferences are weak orders and search for (Maskin-)mono tonic and implementable solutions. We show that for any coalition structure F, the strong F-core is monotonic if and only if it is the individually rational solution. We introduce a solution, which we call the union strong F-core, and show that this solution is the minimal way to expand the strong F-core recovering monotonicity. We also show that the union strong F-core is implementable. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.