-
作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead...
-
作者：D'Agata, A
作者单位：University of Catania
摘要：This paper provides sufficient (as well as necessary) conditions for the integral of a correspondence defined on a measure space with atoms to exhibit star-shaped values. This result is used to analyze the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of agents with atoms and of a competitive equilibrium in economies with mixed markets. In either case it is shown that an exact equilibrium exists whenever atoms are small enough. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Ghirardato, P; Maccheroni, F; Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：Economists often operate under an implicit assumption that the tastes of a decision maker are quite stable, while his beliefs change with the availability of new information. We show that for a general class of preferences, a separation of a key component of tastes, the utility function, from the other components of the representation is possible only if the decision maker's preferences satisfy a mild but not completely innocuous condition, called 'certainty independence'. We also outline the ...
-
作者：Sveen, T; Weinke, L
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Norges Bank
摘要：Our main result is that dynamic new-Keynesian (DNK) models with firm-specific capital feature a substantial amount of endogenous price stickiness. We use this insight to assess the desirability of alternative interest rate rules, and make the case for combining active monetary policy with interest rate smoothing and/or some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to real economic activity. The key mechanism behind our results is also useful from a positive point of view: the feature of fir...
-
作者：Romano, R; Yildrim, H
作者单位：Duke University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction function...
-
作者：Meier, M
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper extends the nonexistence result of Heifetz and Samet (Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 260 273). They have shown that there exists no universal knowledge space to which every knowledge space can be mapped in a knowledge-preserving manner. We show that an analogous nonexistence result holds in the more general context of information structures. These structures can be viewed as generalizations of knowledge spaces that describe non-probabilistic beliefs. (c) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights ...
-
作者：Esö, P
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (CARA preferences, binary types), and characterize the optimal mechanism for a risk-neutral seller. We show that the optimal auction extracts all buyer surplus whenever the correlation is sufficiently strong (greater than 1/3 in absolute value), no matter how risk averse the buyers are. In contrast, we note that a sufficiently risk-averse seller would not use a full rent extracting mechanism for ...
-
作者：Fleurbaey, M; Suzumura, K; Tadenuma, K
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Hitotsubashi University; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference surfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto p...
-
作者：Masatlioglu, Y; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one's current situation on her choice behavior, the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias, and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case. We follow a revealed preference approach, and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect, and that are applicable in any c...
-
作者：Alcalde-Unzu, J; Ballester, MA
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra
摘要：An earlier work by Dutta and Sen provides characterizations of a set of decision rules for the ranking of opportunity sets. This paper begins by demonstrating the redundancy of one of the axioms in the said characterizations and goes on to analyze in detail one of the theorems, the Generalized Utilitarian rules theorem, which is incorrect. Basically, we find that one of the axioms that the authors provide is not in all cases satisfied for the Utilitarian rules. In this paper, we discuss this i...
