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作者：Bassetto, M
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：How should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome? In this paper, I show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question, and I propose an alternative. I show that the complete description of an optimal (indeed, of any) policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected. The specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and whic...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Stachurski, J
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Kyoto University
摘要：The paper proposes an Euler equation technique for analyzing the stability of differentiable stochastic programs. The main innovation is to use marginal reward directly as a Foster-Lyapunov function. This allows us to extend known stability results for stochastic optimal growth models, both weakening hypotheses and strengthening conclusions. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hellwig, MF
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers' net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers' risks,...
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作者：Ghiglino, C
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bern
摘要：We explore the link between wealth inequality and stability in a two-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. We show that when the inverse of absolute risk aversion (or risk tolerance) is a strictly convex function, wealth inequality is a factor that favors instability. In the opposite case, inequality favors stability. Our characterization also shows that whenever absolute risk tolerance is linear, as when preferences exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), wealt...
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作者：Hoppe, HC; Lehmann-Grube, U
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Hamburg
摘要：We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advant...
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作者：Farmer, REA; Lahiri, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We study a class of utility functions that are defined recursively by an aggregator W (x, y) where u(t) = W (c(t), u(t+1)). In single-agent economies it is known that a sufficient condition for the existence of a balanced growth path is that utility should be homogenous of degree y. In the context of a multi-agent economy we show that this restriction implies that either a balanced growth equilibrium fails to exist or all agents have the same constant discount factor. We suggest a generalizati...
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作者：Beggs, AW
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper examines the convergence of payoffs and strategies in Erev and Roth's model of reinforcement learning. When all players use this rule it eliminates iteratively dominated strategies and in two-person constant-sum games average payoffs converge to the value of the game. Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or if they are mixed and the game is 2 x 2. The long-run behaviour of the learning rule is governed by equations related to Maynard Smit...
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作者：Köbberling, V; Wakker, PP
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：To a considerable extent, risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion. Several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature. The one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components: basic utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion. The index is independent of the unit of payment. The main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices. (c) 2...
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作者：Moulin, H; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Under partial responsibility, the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of demands. The Solidarity axiom says that if agent i demands more j should not pay more if k pays less. It characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, sharing cost in proportion to 'resealed' demands. Full responsibility, rules out cross-subsidization for additively separable costs. Restricting solidarity to submodular cost characterizes the fixed-flow, methods, containing the Shapley-Shubik and serial met...
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作者：Benhabib, J; Eusepi, S
作者单位：New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies. We show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities, even under active policies that yield local determinacy. We also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation. We then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria. We show that...
