Alliances and negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 128-141
• 关键词: alliances; multiperson bargaining

摘要

Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.