Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manelli, AM; Vincent, DR
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1-35
• 关键词: Auctions; monopoly pricing; price discrimination; multi-dimensional mechanism design; incentive compatibility; adverse selection

摘要

Multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price-bundle pair of his choice. We identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules. We then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the n-object case. We use these results to characterize environments, mainly distributions of valuations, where bundling is the optimal mechanism in the two and three good cases. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.