Contest architecture

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moldovanu, B; Sela, A
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 70-96
• 关键词: elimination tournaments; optimal architecture; prizes; incentives

摘要

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.