Dynamic price competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
• 署名单位: Aalto University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 232-263
• 关键词: Dynamic competition; marginal contribution; Markov perfect equilibrium; common agency

摘要

We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by doing and habit formation in consumption. We characterize Markovian equilibria for finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and show that the stationary infinite horizon version of the model possesses an efficient equilibrium where all the sellers receive an equilibrium payoff equal to their marginal contribution to the social welfare. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.