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作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occasionally receives opportunities to update his choice of strategy. When such an opportunity arises, the agent selects a strategy that is currently optimal, but only after his payoffs have been randomly perturbed. We prove that the resulting evolutionary process converges to approximate Nash equilibrium in both the medium run and the long run in three general classes of population games: stable g...
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作者：Gonzalez, Francisco A.
作者单位：University of Calgary
摘要：This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. ...
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作者：Newman, Andrew F.
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：In the Knightian theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as occupational self-selection. Moral hazard prevents full insurance; increases in an agent's wealth then entail increases in risk borne. Thus, even under decreasing risk aversion, there are robust instances in which workers are wealthier than entrepreneu...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study the evolutionary stability of purified equilibria of two-player normal form games, providing simple sufficient conditions for stability and for instability under the Bayesian best response dynamic. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Ritsumeikan University
摘要：A state space has been assumed as a primitive for modeling uncertainty, which presumes that the analyst knows all the uncertainties a decision maker (DM) perceives. This is problematic because states are private information of the DM, and hence are not directly observable to the analyst. Dekel et al. [Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space, Econometrica 69 (2001) 891-934] derive, rather than assume, the subjective state space from preference over suitable choice objects....
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作者：Vayanos, Dimitri; Wang, Tan
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of British Columbia
摘要：We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two assets with identical payoffs. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one asset, but can decide which one. We show the existence of a clientele equilibrium where all short-horizon investors search for the same asset. This asset has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, and trades at a higher price relative to its identical -payoff counterpart. The c...
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作者：Bramoulle, Yann; Kranton, Rachel
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Laval University; Laval University
摘要：This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new li...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Mobius, Markus; Szeidl, Adam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University
摘要：We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gromb, Denis; Martimort, David
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about a project's value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusion, the multiexpert organization dominates the single expert organization. However, this ranking is re...
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作者：Peretto, Pietro F.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modem Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income ta...
