Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandholm, William H.
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 641-667
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; best response dynamic; Harsanyi purification

摘要

We study the evolutionary stability of purified equilibria of two-player normal form games, providing simple sufficient conditions for stability and for instability under the Bayesian best response dynamic. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.