Effective property rights, conflict and growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gonzalez, Francisco A.
• 署名单位: University of Calgary
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.011
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 127-139
• 关键词: Property rights; CONFLICT; Diversion; INVESTMENT; GROWTH

摘要

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.