Public goods in networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bramoulle, Yann; Kranton, Rachel
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Laval University; Laval University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 478-494
• 关键词: strategic substitutes; independent sets; experimentation; information sharing

摘要

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.