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作者：Charness, Gary; Corominas-Bosch, Margarida; Frechette, Guillaume R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Pompeu Fabra University; New York University
摘要：We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. The results diverge sharply depending on how a connection is made between two separate simple networks, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematicall...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：What modem game theorists describe as fictitious play is not the learning process George W. Brown defined in his 1951 paper. Brown's original version differs in a subtle detail, namely the order of belief updating. In this note we revive Brown's original fictitious play process and demonstrate that this seemingly innocent detail allows for an extremely simple and intuitive proof of convergence in an interesting and large class of games: nondegenerate ordinal potential games. (c) 2006 Elsevier ...
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作者：Ho, Teck H.; Camerer, Colin F.; Chong, Juin-Kuan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology; National University of Singapore; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：Self-tuning experience weighted attraction (EWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning in games. It addresses a criticism that an earlier model (EWA) has too many parameters, by fixing some parameters at plausible values and replacing others with functions of experience so that they no longer need to be estimated. Consequently, it is econometrically simpler than the popular weighted fictitious play and reinforcement learning models. The functions of experience which replace free parameters sel...
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作者：Ledyard, John O.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surpl...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Ortmann, Andreas
作者单位：Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Czech Academy of Sciences; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Cheap talk is shown to facilitate coordination on the unique efficient equilibrium in experimental order-statistic games. This result is roughly consistent with theoretical predictions according to which cheap talk promotes efficient Nash play. The evidence concerning the mechanisms that theory appeals to is mixed: Frequent agreement of messages and actions is consistent with messages being viewed as self-committing. Risk in the underlying game and the absence of self-signaling messages may ex...
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作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop-out rates and there will be a persisten...
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作者：Inarra, Elena; Larrea, Ma. Concepcion; Saracho, Ana I.
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：This paper analyzes the supercore of a system derived from a normal-form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the last game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoner's dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal-form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with th...
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作者：Veneziani, Roberto
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：This paper analyses exploitation and class formation in a dynamic context. An intertemporal model of a subsistence economy is set up and, among other results, it is proved that, in an interior equilibrium, Differential Ownership of (Scarce) Productive Assets is an inherent feature of a capitalist economy, while exploitation tends to disappear in the long run. Asset inequality is therefore proved to be a normatively secondary (though causally primary) wrong. It is also argued that these results...
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作者：Cardona, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：Universitat de les Illes Balears; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q >= 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the mono...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects...
