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作者：Amarante, Massimiliano; Filiz, Emel
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We study the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity [L.G. Epstein, J. Zhang, Subjective probabilities on subjectively unambiguous events, Econometrica 69 (2001) 265-306; P. Ghirardato et al., Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, J. Econ. Theory H 8 (2004) 133-173; K. Nehring, Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence, Math. Soc. Sci. 38 (1999) 197-213; J. Zhang, Subjective, ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility, Econ. Theo...
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作者：Sotomayor, Marilda
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：Multiple-partners assignment game is the name used by Sotomayor [The multiple partners game, in: M. Majumdar (Ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale, The Macmillan Press Ltd., New York, 1992; The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game, Int. J. Game Theory 28 (1999) 567-583] to describe the cooperative structure of the many-to-many matching market with additively separable utilities. Stability concept is proved to be diffe...
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作者：Xu, Yongsheng; Zhou, Lin
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：Collective choices are often cyclic and cannot be rationalized by maximization of a single linear ordering. In this paper, we identify conditions under which collective choices, potentially cyclic, can be rationalized by extensive games with perfect information. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：The Savagian choice-theoretic construction of subjective probability does not apply to preferences, like those in the Ellsberg Paradox, that reflect a distinction between risk and ambiguity. We formulate two representation results-one for expected utility, the other for probabilistic sophistication-that derive subjective probabilities but only on a small domain of risky events. Risky events can be either specified exogenously or in terms of choice behavior; in the latter case, both the values ...
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作者：Hamilton, Jonathan; Slutsky, Steven
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：In the standard optimal income taxation problem, tax payments depend only on each consumer's own actions. Piketty [J. Econ. Theory 61 (1993) 23-41] shows that, if one individual's tax schedule depends on others' actions and the government knows the exact ability distribution, it can implement any undistorted allocation as the unique revelation game outcome. If some individuals misreveal their types, Piketty's mechanism may assign infeasible allocations. We require that tax schedules must balan...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Marinacci, Massimo
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
摘要：This note provides a behavioral characterization of mutually absolutely continuous multiple priors. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Xiong, Siyang; Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
作者单位：Iowa State University; Northwestern University
摘要：In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account, and we prove an analog of the Debreu-Scarf theorem for replica production economies. Our theorem differs from theirs in using an additional assumption, which we argue is indis...
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作者：Peters, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：The no-externalities condition provided in the text is not sufficient for Theorems 3 and 4 when effort is not fully contractable. In the case where the principals cannot contract at all on agent's effort, the condition in the text requires that for any set of alternatives offered by the principal there is one that is at least as good as all other alternatives in the set for the agent no matter what the other principal does, no matter what effort the agent takes, and no matter what the agent's ...
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作者：Scroggin, Steven
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：In repeated fixed-pair constant-sum games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies, such as matching pennies, the subgame perfect equilibrium is repeating the stage-game mixed-strategy equilibrium action. In such games rational players avoid strategies that are exploitable, in that current actions either deviate systematically from the equilibrium action probabilities or fail to be serially independent of past actions. I revisit classic experiments and find that subjects' actions are sometim...
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作者：Luttmer, Erzo G. J.; Mariotti, Thomas
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. If consumers have identical discount factors, then allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation-proof. In an economy with a sequence of markets, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic endowments, only if preferences are locally homothetic. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
