Information transmission in coalitional voting games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv
• 署名单位: Brown University; Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 117-137
• 关键词: Core; incomplete information; coalitional voting; resilience; Mediation

摘要

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra [Incomplete information, credibility and the core, Math. Soc. Sci. 50 (2005) 148-165] and the core proposed by Myerson [Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information, Mimeo, University of Chicago, 2005] as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.