Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myerson, Roger B.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 260-285
• 关键词: inner core; incomplete information; Virtual utility

摘要

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms. Blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive-compatible mediation plan. Membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator. Nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure, independent types, and sidepayments. An offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking. Core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual-utility scales that generalize the weighted-utility scales of the inner core. Mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.