The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 461-473
• 关键词: Repeated games; COMMUNICATION; private monitoring; folk theorem

摘要

We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with almost public information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these third parties to effectively enforce contracts. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.