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作者：Bosmans, Kristof; Lauwers, Luc; Ooghe, Erwin
作者单位：KU Leuven; Maastricht University
摘要：The unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle demands that a regressive transfer in income-a transfer from worse-off (poor) to better-off (rich)-decreases social welfare. In a multidimensional setting the direct link between income (or any other attribute) and individual well-being is absent. We interpret the social welfare level of a distribution in which each individual has the same bundle as the individual wellbeing level. We define regressivity on the basis of this individual well-bei...
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作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Diecidue, Enrico; Schmidt, Ulrich; Zank, Horst
作者单位：University of Manchester; INSEAD Business School; University of Kiel; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：This paper provides preference foundations for parametric weighting functions under rank-dependent utility. This is achieved by decomposing the independence axiom of expected utility into separate meaningful properties. These conditions allow us to characterize rank-dependent utility with power and exponential weighting functions. Moreover, by allowing probabilistic risk attitudes to vary within the probability interval, a preference foundation for rank-dependent utility with parametric invers...
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作者：Amoros, Pablo
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga
摘要：A jury must provide a ranking of contestants (students applying for scholarships or Ph.D. programs, gymnasts in a competition, etc.). There exists a true ranking which is common knowledge among the jurors, but is not verifiable. The socially optimal rule is that the contestants be ranked according to the true ranking. The jurors are partial and, for example, may have friends (contestants that they would like to benefit) and enemies (contestants that they would like to prejudice). We study nece...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin [P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin, The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, 1: Theory, Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 1-26] and that it is neither implied nor...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Heifetz and Neeman [A. Heifetz, Z. Neeman, On the generic (im)possibility of full surplus extraction, Econometrica 74 (2006) 213-233], using convex combinations of models, showed that full surplus extraction (FSE) in mechanism design is generically impossible, contrary to the seminal work of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 53 (1988) 345-361]. Since Cremer and McLean did not allow convex combination...
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all ...
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作者：Li, Jing
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I construct a state space model with unawareness following [R.J. Aumann, Agreeing to disagree, Ann. Stat. 76 (1976) 1236-1239]. Dekel et al. [E. Dekel, B.L. Lipman, A. Rustichini, Standard state-space models preclude unawareness, Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173] show that standard state space models are incapable of representing unawareness. The model circumvents the impossibility result by endowing the agent with a subjective state space: that differs from the full state space when he has the ...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Vienna
摘要：Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Stat. Phys. 4 (1973) 295-300], Rashid [S. Rashid, Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: Asymptotic results, Econ. Letters 12 (1983) 7-10], Mas-Colell [A. Mas-Colell, On a theorem by Schmeidler, J. Math. Econ. 13 (1984) 201-206], Khan and Sun [M. Khan, Y. Sun, Non-cooperative games on hyp...
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作者：Keenan, Donald C.; Snow, Arthur
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：In this paper, we advance a definition of greater downside risk aversion that applies to both large and small changes in risk preference, and thereby complements the results for small changes reported previously. We show that a downside risk-averse transformation of a utility function results in a function that is more downside risk averse in the same manner that a risk-averse transformation increases risk aversion. Our demonstration is conducted first by using the compensated approach introdu...
