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作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：We prove that, around the symmetric case, where the values are identically distributed, the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder-specific parameters of the value distributions. We show that the revenue equivalence between the first-price and the second-price auctions to the first-order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem; thereby formally establishing t...
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作者：Arawatari, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for ...
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作者：Martinez, Leonardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as argued in the political cycles literature, and these political cycles are less important when the po...
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作者：Eeckhoudt, Louis; Schlesinger, Harris; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; IESEG School of Management; INSEAD Business School; INSEAD Business School
摘要：Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states. In particular, assume that the random wealth variable (X) over tilde (i) dominates (Y) over tilde (i) via ith-order stochastic dominance for i = M, N. We show that the 50-50 lottery [(X) over tilde (N) + (Y) over tilde (M), (Y) over tilde (N) + (X) over tilde (M)] dominates the lottery [(X) over tilde (N) + (X) over tilde (M), (Y) over tilde (N) + (Y) over tilde (M) via (N + M)th-order stochastic dominance. The basic...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise ...
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作者：Higashi, Youichiro; Hyogo, Kazuya; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Hosei University; Ryukoku University
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time. For this purpose, we formulate an infinite horizon extension of [E. Dekel, B. Lipman, A. Rustichini, Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space, Econometrica 69 (2001) 891-934], and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those ab...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modeled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we provide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general Likelihood Compatibility axiom relating preferences and probabilistic beliefs and characterize its implications for the class of invariant bisepa...
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作者：Bag, Parimal Kanti; Sabourian, Hamid; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：University of Cambridge; National University of Singapore; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequent...
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作者：Klibanoff, Peter; Marinacci, Massimo; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; Northwestern University; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of the Smooth Ambiguity decision model developed in [P. Klibanoff, M. Marinacci, S. Mukerji, A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity, Econometrica 73 (6) (2005) 1849-1892]. A key feature of the model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. In applications one may thus specify/var...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki; Frechette, Guillaume
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. We find that subjects' payoffs (i) decrease as noise increases, and (ii) are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise, but exceed it for high noise. Under the assumption that the subjects' strategy uses thresholds on the public signal for transition between coope...
