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作者：Ambrus, Attila
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying...
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作者：Martimort, David; Stole, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Chicago
摘要：We characterize equilibrium payoffs of a delegated common agency game in a public good context where principals use smooth contribution schedules. We prove that under complete information, payoff vectors of equilibria with truthful schedules coincide with the set of smooth equilibrium payoffs, including non-truthful schedules. We next consider whether the presence of arbitrarily small amounts of asymmetric information is enough to refine this payoff set. Providing that the extensions of the eq...
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作者：Noor, Jawwad
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：The experimental literature on time preference finds that the manner in which subjects discount money (as opposed to utility) exhibits properties known as Decreasing Impatience and the Magnitude Effect. While these findings are often referred to as anomalies for the Exponential Discounting model, several authors have demonstrated that each of these qualitative findings can be explained by the curvature of utility and thus are not anomalies. We prove that, under basic regularity conditions, the...
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作者：Rodrigues-Neto, Jose Alvaro
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We present new necessary and sufficient conditions for checking if a set of players' posteriors may come from a common prior. A simple diagrammatic device calculates the join and meet of players' knowledge partitions. Each cycle in the diagram has a corresponding cycle equation. Posteriors are consistent with a common prior if and only if all cycle equations are satisfied. We prove that in games of two players, where the join partition has only singletons, a common prior exists if each player'...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Yonsei University; Columbia University
摘要：We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may, collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction - i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free, environment - can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are mu...
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作者：Marcet, Albert; Scott, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy anti it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other Variables and it increases in response to shocks that Cause a higher deficit. Data fo...
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作者：Cho, Seok-ju; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester; Yale University
摘要：We give it game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181-1206] model of distributive politics, We prove that as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter's ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some delay,...
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作者：Dellis, Arnaud
作者单位：Laval University
摘要：We investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation. We do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account, namely, strategic voting, endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates. We consider two classes of voting rules. One class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally-weighed votes for the different candidates. The other class consists of the voting rules where each vo...
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作者：Meirowitz, Adam; Shotts, Kenneth W.
作者单位：Princeton University; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a two-period model of elections in which voters have private information about their policy preferences. A first-period vote can have two types of consequences: it may be pivotal in the first election and it provides a signal that affects candidates' positions in the second election. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the effect of a single vote is enormous. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling effect, but the effect of a single vote is small....
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作者：Dubra, Juan; Echenique, Federico; Manelli, Alejandro M.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universidad de Montevideo; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economics with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economics. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
