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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Citanna, Alessandro; Ostrovsky, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; York University - Canada; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observ...
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作者：Chen, Bo
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques [T. Sekiguchi, Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361; V. Bhaskar, I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69] cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are suff...
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作者：Dudek, Maciej K.
作者单位：Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：Fully rational agents are allowed to optimize over expectations formation technologies in an environment where it is costly to collect and process information. It is shown in a general equilibrium framework that optimization over expectations by rational and forward-oriented agents can lead to endogenous instability. Specifically, we illustrate that resulting equilibria can be both chaotic and self-consistent with the distribution of agents' expected forecasting errors coinciding with the actu...
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作者：Murty, Sushama
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Starrett (1972) [33] and Boyd and Conley (1997) [7] approaches to externality modeling are unified by distinguishing between producible and nonproducible public commodities. Nonconvexities are associated with detrimental producible public commodities but not with nonproducible public commodities in Boyd and Conley (1997) [7]. Disposability properties (costly or costless) imply that producible public commodities are either by-products (e.g., pollution) or joint-products (e.g., national defense)...
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作者：Peress, Joel
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：The production of information in financial markets is limited by the extent of risk sharing. The wider a stock's investor base, the smaller the risk borne by each shareholder and the less valuable information. A firm which expands its investor base without raising capital affects its information environment through three channels: (i) it induces incumbent shareholders to reduce their research effort as a result of improved risk sharing, (ii) it attracts potentially informed investors, and (iii...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Schlag, Karl H.
作者单位：University of Leicester; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004) [4]). (C) 2009...
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作者：Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：The framework in Lagos and Wright (2005) [20] combining decentralized and centralized markets is used extensively in monetary economics. Much is known about that model, but there is a loose end: only under special assumptions about bargaining power or decentralized market preferences has it been shown that the monetary steady state is unique. For general decentralized market utility and bargaining, I prove uniqueness for generic parameters with fiat money, and for all parameters with commodity...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology
摘要：A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule. conditions her prior only on th...
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作者：Gossner, Olivier; Hoerner, Johannes
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Yale University
摘要：We study the relationship between a player's lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring and this player's min max payoff in the corresponding one-shot game. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoff's coincide for any payoff matrix. Under an identifiability assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated game nearly satisfies this condition, then these two payoffs are approximately equal, independently...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9]) is ordinally efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function, if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type, then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (regardless of the number of other agent...
