A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Bo
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 402-420
• 关键词: Repeated prisoner's dilemma; Asymmetric private monitoring; Belief-based approach; folk theorem

摘要

This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques [T. Sekiguchi, Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361; V. Bhaskar, I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69] cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are sufficiently different. We then modify the previous belief-based approach by letting the player with smaller observation errors always randomize between cooperate and defect along the cooperative path of the play. We show that with vanishing observation errors, efficiency and a folk theorem can be approximated using our modified belief-based strategies. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.