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作者：Khanna, Naveen; Schroder, Mark
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
摘要：We show how competition in oligopolies, with the possibility of failure and exit of a levered incumbent, affects the ex-ante design of optimal debt contracts. When a levered firm's profits are unobservable, a debt contract imposes the threat of nonrenewal to induce truthful revelation. Because nonrenewal impacts the future profitability of the surviving competitor, the contract influences the competitor's pricing strategy and the equilibrium profits of both firms. The optimal contract is quite...
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作者：Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I investigate whether a large community can sustain cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma by having cheaters punished not by their victims but by third parties. In the setting where players can observe their partners' past play only, I show that cooperation can be sustained by an equilibrium that has the following two properties: players choose their actions independently of their own past play, and they are indifferent between cooperation and defection at all histories. This equilibr...
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作者：Jean, Kasie; Rabinovich, Stanislav; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Green and Zhou relax the assumption, made in early search-based models of monetary exchange, of indivisible money. Their paper and various extensions make much technical progress, and derive some interesting substantive results. In particular, they show there is ail indeterminacy of steady-state monetary equilibria. We reconsider this result in the framework of Lagos and Wright, which is more tractable. We show that a similar multiplicity arises, and is much easier to derive and understand. We...
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, quasiconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result are also established. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Guo, Jang-Ting; Harrison, Sharon G.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We examine a two-sector real business cycle (RBC) model with sector-specific externalities in which household utility exhibits no income effect on the demand for leisure. Unlike in the one-sector counterpart, indeterminacy can result with sufficiently high returns-to-scale in the investment sector. Moreover, the smaller the labor Supply elasticity, the lower the level of externalities needed for indeterminacy. This finding is the opposite of that in all existing RBC-based indeterminacy studies...
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作者：Krueger, Dirk; Lustig, Hanno
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In a standard incomplete markets model with a continuum of households that have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, the absence of insurance markets for idiosyncratic labor income risk has no effect on the premium for aggregate risk if the distribution of idiosyncratic risk is independent of aggregate shocks and aggregate consumption growth is independent over time. In equilibrium, households Only use the stock market to smooth consumption; the bond market is inoperative. Furth...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals as the generalized fixed point of the decumulative distribution of the players' ideal points as induced by the recognition probabilities. In contrast to the existing litera...
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Schmedders, Karl
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper develops a method to compute the equilibrium correspondence for exchange economics with semi-algebraic preferences. Given a class of semi-algebraic exchange economies parameterized by individual endowments and possibly other exogenous variables such as preference parameters or asset payoffs, there exists a semi-algebraic correspondence that maps parameters to positive numbers such that for generic parameters each competitive equilibrium can be associated with an element of the corre...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper proposes two (ordinal and cardinal) generalizations of [J.C. Harsanyi, R. Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1988] risk-dominance to multi-player, multi-action games. There are three reasons why generalized risk-dominance (GR-dominance) is interesting. Extending the logic of risk-dominance, GR-dominant actions can be interpreted as best responses to conjectures that satisfy a certain type of symmetry. Second, in a local i...
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作者：Van Zandt, Timothy
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs and from general existence results for non-supermodular Bayesian games: (a) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which each player's beliefs are part of his or her type rather than being derived from a prior; (b) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each pla...
