Stochastic stability for roommate markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2218-2240
• 关键词: Core; (Pairwise) stability; Roommate markets; stochastic stability

摘要

We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.