Justifiable group choice

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens
• 署名单位: Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.12.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 583-602
• 关键词: Judgment aggregation; Logical aggregation; social choice; Majority Voting; Justifying choice; (Non-)truth-functionality

摘要

We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied doctrinal paradox provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that genuine possibility results emerge if there is a gap between the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the decision. This happens, for instance, if there is only a partial consensus about the appropriate criteria for the decision, if only a subset of these criteria can be elicited, or if the judgment on criteria is based on probabilistic acceptance thresholds. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.