Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona; Universidad de Malaga
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1648-1674
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; Sequential inclusion; single-peaked preferences; separable preferences

摘要

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.