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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; DiCecio, Riccardo
作者单位：Cornell University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：Entry costs vary dramatically across countries. To assess their impact on cross-country differences in output and TFP, we construct a model with endogenous entry and operation decisions by firms. We calibrate the model to match the U.S. distribution of employment and firms by size. Higher entry costs lead to greater misallocation of productive factors and lower TFP and output. In the model, countries in the lowest decile of the entry costs distribution have 1.32 to 1.45 times higher TFP and 1....
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作者：Strzalecki, Tomasz
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper shows that in the class of variational preferences the notion of probabilistic sophistication is equivalent to expected utility as long as there exists at least one event such that the independence axiom holds for bets on that event. This extends the result of Marinacci (2002) [13] and provides a novel interpretation of his result. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Bejan, Camelia
作者单位：Brown University; Rice University
摘要：We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfaris...
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作者：Kamiya, Kazuya; Shimizu, Takashi
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Kansai University
摘要：In this paper, we present a search model with divisible money in which there exists a continuum of monetary equilibria with strictly increasing continuous value functions and with non-discrete money holdings distributions. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210-217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signa...
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作者：Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, as long as uninformed experts do not learn the correct forecasts too quickly, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed experts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on some data-generating processes; however, the set of such processes is topologically small. These results contrast sharply with many negative r...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the st...
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作者：Habis, Helga; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Maastricht University; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is...
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作者：Ferraris, Leo; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper studies economy-wide fluctuations that occur endogenously in the presence of monetary and real assets. Using a standard monetary search model, we consider an economy in which agents can increase consumption, over and above what their liquid monetary asset holdings would allow, pledging real assets as collateral for monetary loans. It is shown that, if the liquidation value of real assets is below full market value, a stable cyclical equilibrium can emerge in consumption and capital ...
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作者：Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement e-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of epsilon-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. Al...
