The robustness of robust implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Morris, Stephen
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.011
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2093-2104
• 关键词: Robust implementation; Ex-post implementation; Social choice correspondence; Belief-dependent outcomes

摘要

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement e-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of epsilon-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.