No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Clippel, Geoffroy; Bejan, Camelia
• 署名单位: Brown University; Rice University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.015
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1995-2012
• 关键词: Social choice; Axiomatic bargaining; Welfarism; egalitarianism

摘要

We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.