Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents (vol 123, pg 210, 2005)

• 成果类型: Correction
• 署名作者: Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2159-2164
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Surplus extraction; Correlated information; Blackwell's theorem

摘要

We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210-217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signals about other agents' types. Instead, such an interpretation is warranted only when the weights used to span an agent's set of beliefs stand in a singular relation with the prior type distribution that is known as an alternative characterization of Blackwell dominance. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.