2期

最新文章

• Dynamic sender-receiver games AI翻译
  作者：Renault, Jerome; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
  作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
  摘要：We consider a dynamic version of sender receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the re...
• Untitled AI翻译
  作者：Pavan, Alessandro; Lagos, Ricardo; Siniscalchi, Marciano; Vives, Xavier
• Endogenous credit limits with small default costs AI翻译
  作者：Azariadis, Costas; Kaas, Leo
  作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Konstanz
  摘要：We analyze an exchange economy of unsecured credit where borrowers have the option to declare bankruptcy in which case they are temporarily excluded from financial markets Endogenous credit limits are imposed that are just tight enough to prevent default. Economies with temporary exclusion differ from their permanent exclusion counterparts in two important properties. If households are extremely patient, then the first-best allocation is an equilibrium in the latter economies but not necessari...
• Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design AI翻译
  作者：Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
  摘要：We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents all ex post efficient allocations are. In environments with independent private values esse...
• Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes AI翻译
  作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi
  作者单位：University of Tokyo
  摘要：This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation that underlies the willingness of rational arbitrageurs to delay and reinforce the speculative attack. The key assumptions are that there is a small probability that arbitrageurs are behavioral and never time the market of their own accord and it is uncertain whether arbitrageurs are behavioral or rational. We model a stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs compete to react quickest. We show that rational arbitrageurs are willing ...
• Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games AI翻译
  作者：Friedman, Daniel; Ostrov, Daniel N.
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Santa Clara University
  摘要：Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative subset of the entire population. Assuming that players respond to the payoff gradient over a continuous action space, we obtain nonlinear integro-partial differential equations that are numerically tractable and sometimes analytically tractable. Economic applications include oligopoly, growth theory, and financial bubbles ...
• Coalitional manipulation on networks AI翻译
  作者：Ju, Biung-Ghi
  作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
  摘要：We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a variet...
• Linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers AI翻译
  作者：Bishnu, Monisankar
  作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
  摘要：This paper opens a new perspective from which one can explain the presence of government intervention in education even in the absence of human capital externality. It argues that consumption externalities can provide rationale for government intervention in education. Within the context of overlapping generations economy, it has also been shown that competitive equilibrium either underaccumulates both physical and human capital or overaccumulates both. Thus the result rules out the possibilit...
• Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities AI翻译
  作者：Danan, Eric; Gajdos, Thibault; Tallon, Jean-Marc
  作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
  摘要：We analyze the preference aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals and society with sets of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axioms and show they imply a generalization of the classical neutrality assumption. We then characterize the class of neutral social welfare f...