Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Danan, Eric; Gajdos, Thibault; Tallon, Jean-Marc
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.018
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 663-688
• 关键词: aggregation; vNM utility; indeterminacy; neutrality; Utilitarianism

摘要

We analyze the preference aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals and society with sets of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axioms and show they imply a generalization of the classical neutrality assumption. We then characterize the class of neutral social welfare functions. This class is considerably broader for indeterminate than for determinate utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. We finally characterize several classes of neutral social welfare functions for indeterminate utilities, including the utilitarian and multi-utilitarian classes. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.