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作者：Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Yang, Chun-Lei
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：We propose a framework of consistent finite-order priors to facilitate the incorporation of higher-order uncertainties into Bayesian game analysis, without invoking the concept of a universal type space. Several recent models, which give rise to stunning results with higher-order uncertainties, turn out to operate with certain consistent order-2 priors. We introduce canonical representations of consistent finite-order priors, which we apply to establish a criterion for determining the orders o...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Bern; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Rice University
摘要：Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optima...
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作者：Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Ollscoil na Gaillimhe-University of Galway
摘要：A model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a triangular norm which establishes a lower bound on the degree to which a proposition is true whenever it is entailed by a set of propositions. Under standard assumptions, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the collective judgments to be both deductively closed and free from veto power. This ...
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作者：Artemov, Georgy; Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Hitotsubashi University; Brown University
摘要：We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions A, we use triangle-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, A-incentive compatibility and is-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of fir...
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作者：Azariadis, Costas; Chen, Been-Lon; Lu, Chia-Hui; Wang, Yin-Chi
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Academia Sinica - Taiwan; National Taipei University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper considers the impact of leisure preference and leisure externalities on growth and labor supply in a Lucas (1988) [12] type model, as in Gomez (2008) [7], with a separable non-homothetic utility and the assumption that physical and human capital are both necessary inputs in both the goods and the education sectors. In spite of the non-concavities due to the leisure externality, the balanced growth path is always unique, which guarantees global stability for comparative-static exerci...
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作者：Loewenstein, Mark; Willard, Gregory A.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We show that an unbounded number of consumption dates is necessary to support an asset pricing bubble. We work in a continuous-time model where the number of trade dates is infinite but the number of consumption dates is flexible and can be chosen to be uniformly bounded, finite almost surely, or infinite. Market clearing, together with monotone preferences for consumption, limits the properties of bubbles and provides restrictions on wealth constraints. In the special case of a uniformly boun...
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作者：Armstrong, Mark
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper discusses the incentive to bundle when consumer valuations are non-additive and/or when products are supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, a firm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount when demand for the bundle is more elastic than the overall demand for products. When separate sellers coordinate on a bundle discount, they can use the discount to relax competition, which can harm welfare. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Decker, Colin; Lieb, Elliott H.; McCann, Robert J.; Stephens, Benjamin K.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Princeton University
摘要：Choo and Siow (2006) [7] proposed a model for the marriage market which allows for random identically distributed McFadden-type noise in the preferences of each of the participants. In this note we exhibit a strictly convex function whose derivatives vanish precisely at the equilibria of their model. This implies uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium marriage distribution, simplifies the argument for its existence, and gives a representation of it in closed form. We go on to derive smooth de...
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作者：Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：College of the Holy Cross
摘要：This paper addresses the role of non-binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency. Present-biased agents have linear reference-dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point. They face an infinite horizon, optimal stopping problem in continuous time. When there is sufficient commitment to expectation-based goals, goal-setting attenuates the present-biased agent's tendency to stop too early, and may even lead an agent to wait longer than the first-best. In partic...
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作者：Viossat, Yannick; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of London
摘要：Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are epsilon-best reply dynamics where a is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
