Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Siegel, Ron
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 684-702
• 关键词: Contests; All-pay; auctions; asymmetries; interdependent valuations; Correlated signals

摘要

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.